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87 S.Ct. 824]. (See also Ross v. California (1968) 391 U.S. 
470 [20 L.Ed.2d 750, 88 S.Ct. 1850].) 
JYlcCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I dissent from 
the reversal of the judgIllent imposing the death penalty for 
the reason that, in my opinion, the error complained of did 
not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. CDnst., art. VI, 
~ 13.) 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 1969. 
l\losk, J., did not participate therein. Traynor, C. J., and 
Peters, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
[Crim. No. 11170. In Bank. Apr. 11, 1969.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. MARK C. 
OSUNA and JACK R. GORMAN, Defendants and Ap-
pellants. 
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-Evidence-Identification-Voice.-The 
pretrial identification procedure as to a codefendant charged 
with robbery-murder was not so suggestive as to give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification and the use of such 
identification, and an in-court identification based thereon did 
not deny due process of law, where one victim of the robbery 
who had heard the robbers talk for over two hours at the 
crime seene but had not seen them unmasked testified that he 
identified codefendant at the district attorney's office first by 
standing outside the door and listening to him talk with the 
district attorney for 10 or 15 minutes, and then by coming 
into the office and confronting him, voice identification before 
confrontation being reasonable under such circumstances; 
where, although it might have been prefereable to have se\T. 
eral persons speak, in view of the time the witness was able to 
hear the robbers talk during the crime, it was not unreason· 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 368. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 374(4); [2] Crimi. 
~l~l Law, § 107 (1.5); [3] Criminal Law, § 454.5; [4] Criminal Law, 
~_3!)l (3); [5J Criminal Law, § 627 (1); [6J Criminal Law, § 1382(4) ; 
(.'! ~rill1illal Law, § 1011(6); [8] ~:illlinal Law, § 329~1~ (d); [9] 
J ~l1l111al Law, § 104(1); [10] HomIcIde, § 189; [11] CrImmal Law, 
116(1); [12] Criminal Law, § 791; [13] Jury, § 44. 
760 PEOPLE v. OSUNA r70 C.2d 
able to have him confront a single suspect; and where there 
was nothing in the record to show that the district attorney in 
any way suggested the witness' response. 
[2] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Police Lineup.-The 
otherwise admissible pretrial identification of a defendant who 
did not have the assistance of counsel at the time was not 
thereby rendered inadmissible where the identification took 
place before the decisions of Wade and Gilbert. 
[3] Id.-Evidence-Declarations and Admissions of Codefendant. 
-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, state-
ments of defendant and codefendant in conversations with 
their friends or confederates which took place on the day of 
the killing while defendants were still at large were common 
admissions of both and therefore admissible against both, 
where during the conversations each defendant recounted 
various details of the crimes, and had one disagreed with what 
the other said, it was reasonable to assume that he would ha\'e 
said so. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes-Connecting Defendant With 
Crime Charged.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two 
defendants, the probative value of evidence of a prior burglary 
committed by them consisting of the testimony of an accomp-
lice to the burglary, which was corroborated by other evidence 
connecting defendants with guns taken during such burglary, 
outweighed any possible prejudicial effect the evidence might 
have had, where the evidence was relevant to show that 
defendants had the guns used in the charged robbe~ and 
murder, and played a significant part in completing a chain of 
physical evidence that could dispel any doubt with respeet to 
identification of defendants or the testimony of witnesses 1rbo 
were or may have been accomplices. 
[5] Id. - Conduct of Counsel- Scope of Concluding Argum8l1t ..... _-
Comments on Witness.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of 
two defendants, the prosecutor's error in closing argument la 
misstating the record of a witness who had acted as look08' 
for the robbery was not prejudicial, where the argum.'-' 
purpose was to rebut a possible inference that the lVibl-
testified pursuant to a bargain with the prosecution,wbere-
objection was made, and where a timely admonition could .. .. 
corrected any effect the misstatement could have had. ..... . . 
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Error B~ 
in View of Evidence as a Whole.-In a robbery-murder ~ . 
. cution of two defendants, it was not prejudicial error to ~ 
a female witness in whose apartment the robbery haa .... -
planned to testify that she was afraid of codefendant ~ 
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he told her and others that he had been imprisoned for 
cutting off a woman's breast and crippling a man for life, 
where there was no motion to strike or to admonish the jury 
to disregard the statement, where the witness' fear was rele-
vant on the issue of whether she was an accomplice whose 
testimony would require corroboration or a person acting 
innocently under "threats or menaces," where, assuming the 
testimony's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value 
and that its admission could not be cured by admonition, it did 
not appear to have contributed ·to the jury's verdict on the 
guilt issue in view of the overwhelming evidence thereof. 
[7] Id.-Judgment-Determinationof Punishment Under Pen. 
Code, § 190.I-Evidence as to Prior Acts.-At the trial on the 
penalty issue of a robbery-murder prosecution of two defend-
ants, the details of crimes for which codefendant had been 
imprisoned were properly proved, and his statement to a 
female witness that he had been in prison because he had cut 
off a woman's breast and crippled a man for life were admis-
sible to show his attitude toward his criminal career, although 
his statement was revealed to· be a somewhat exaggerated 
boast. 
[8] Id.~Trial-Conduct of Judge-Comments on Evidence.-In a 
robbery-murder prosecution 'of two defendants, the trial court 
did not improperly indicate to the jury its belief that defend-
ants had been proved guilty by discussing the timing of the 
trial on the issue of penalty before the conclusion of the trial 
on the issue of guilt, where the trial judge's remarks did not 
indicate that he believed that there would be a trial on the 
penalty issue but merely set forth for the convenience of 
the jury how long such a trial would take if it occurred. 
[9] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Suppression of Evidence . 
.. -,-Ina robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, . there 
was no suppression of evidence by the prosecution that certain 
witnesses were subpoenaed from outside the state, assertedly 
relevant to show the witnesses' flight which would in turn 
support an inference that they were accomplices, where the 
SUbpoenaing, of the witnesses was a matter of record readily 
available to the defense. 
[10] Homicide-Instructions-Second Degree Murder.-In a rob-
bery-murder prosecution of two' defendants, the trial court 
properly refused to instruct on second degree murder where 
there was no evidence that the homicide was other than a first 
degree robbery murder. 
[11] Criminal Law-Instructions-Requests-E:ffect of Failure to 
ltequest.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, 
no error appeared in the court's instruction on evidence of a 
prior burglary committed by defendants which was adequate 
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for a proper consideration of the evidence thereof, where 
defendants did not request a more detailed instruction, and the 
instruction offered by the prosecution was not appropriate to 
the facts of the case. 
[12] Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Sufficiency of Instruc-
tion.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, the 
court's references to finding defendants innocent rather than 
not guilty were in no way misleading and did not indicate that 
defendants had any burden to prove themselves innocent, 
where the court clearly instructed that a finding of innocence 
would be compelled by the failure of the prosecution to prove 
guilt to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[13] Jury-Qualification-Implied Bias-Scruples Against Capital 
Punishment.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defend-
ants, although there was no prejudicial error at the trial on 
the issue of guilt, Witherspoon error compelled reversal of the 
judgment imposing the death penalty where seven of 20 pros-
pective jurors excused for cause on voicing objections to the 
death penalty did not make unmistakably clear that they 
would automatically vote against the imposition of capital 
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be 
developed at the trial, or that their attitude toward the death 
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial deci-
sion as to defendants' guilt. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Prosecution for first degree murder. Judgment of convie-
tion imposing the death penalty as to each defendant reversed 
as to penalty only; in all other respects affirmed. - - --------] 
Mark C. Osuna, in pro. per., Andrew P. SmirnofI and A.,~ 
Leonard Bjorklund, Jr., under appointments by the Supre~_!i\t 
Court, for Defendants and Appellants.::Zi~~ 
> ~'.;');$l:~: 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. HarrisJJr,·/":te 
Assistant Attorney General, Derald E. Granberg and Robert-' 
R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiffan8 
Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendants guilty of tltf --
[13] Capital punishment beliefs as disqnalifying juror in cap~: 
ease for cause, 48 A.L.R.2d 560. See also Cal.Jur.2d, .Tury, § • 
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first degree murder of Mario Ferrari and fixed the penalty for 
each at death. The trial court denied motions for a new trial 
and entered judgment on the verdicts. The appeal is auto-
matic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
The homicide occurred at the Mission Inn, a restaurant and 
bar in San Rafael. About 12 :40 a.m. on September 6, 1965, 
Leo Albertoni, a co-owner and the chef of the Mission Inn, 
left the kitchen to go to his apartment upstairs at the back of 
the inn. On the way he was knocked down by a blow to the 
back of his neck. He got to his feet, and two hooded men 
confronted him with pistols. They tied his hands with wire 
and told him they wanted the safe opened and would kill him 
if he did not cooperate. 
Albertoni did not remember the combination of the safe but 
t.old the robbers that it was written on a paper somewhere on 
the premises. The robbers searched for the combination in 
Yain, but they found two automatic pistols, a .45 and a .32. 
Each took a pistol, one commenting, "It's good that we found 
your guns; we will use these if there is going to be any shoot-
ing, then we will throw them away;" They also took pillows 
from a bed to be used as silencers if necessary. ' 
The robbers stayed with Albertoni in his apartment for over 
two hours waiting for the bar to close and customers to leave. 
About 3 a.m. they took Albertoni downstairs and ordered him 
to call the two bartenders, Mario Ferrari and Alfred Casey, 
from the bar. The robbers ordered the bartenders to stand 
against a wall to be searched. Ferrari made a break for the 
of convjc-:;~:: door, and both robbers opened fire. Ferrari got to the strf'et 
It reversed/- where he fell fatally wounded. Albertoni escaped from the 
'-'--'~.:;~~ .,----, ",building, and as he did"so;-hesawthe robbers 'take the 're,;;--
,ll' and ).:;r ee!~ ti:r ~~t1i~:,:r::~ti1ieddefendants Osuna and Gor-
~ Suprellle,l~"; man as the robbers. He remembered that the one he identified 
as Gorman was slender, had a dark complexion, and wore 
tight black pants, a black nylon windbreaker, black boots, 
green gloves, and a dark hood. He carried a revolver that 
Albertoni estimated to be between a .32 and a .45 caliber. The 
other robber was heavier, had a light complexion, and was 
OVl'r six feet tall; his eyes were light grey, flecked with red 
SPl'Cks, with straight wrinkles radiating from them "like sun 
rays." He carried a .22 caliber pistol with a long shiny barrl'l 
anb d 'Wore a black nylon windbreaker, light blue denim pants, 
lack shoes, green gloves, and a brown-purple hood. 
Albertoni's identification of defendants as the robbers and 
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killers was confirmed by a mass of other evidence. Two wit-
nesses testified that the robbery was planned in their San 
Francisco apartment and that defendants were dressed as 
Albertoni described them. Percell, an accomplice who acted as 
a .lookout, and his girl friend, who was apparently unaware 
that a robbery was planned, testified that they took defend-
ants to the Mission Inn and after hearing shots saw defend-
ants run out of the inn. A girl friend of Gorman's testified 
that defendants told her of their plans for the robbery at her 
apartment the previous afternoon and that they returned 
about 5 a.m. the next morning with three guns, money, and a 
money bag. Osuna described what had happened in consider-
able detail, but Gorman was relatively quiet. Later in the day 
defendants, the accomplice and his girl friend, and one of the 
women in whose -apartment the robbery was planned had 
coffee together in a coffee shop where both defendants dis-
cussed the homicide in detail. 
Other evidence was introduced to show that defendants got 
the guns they took to the Mission Inn during a burglary at a 
Sacramento home and that some of the guns that the police 
recovered from various places where defendants had aban-
doned them after the killing had been fired at the Mission 
Inn. 
The only defense evidence at the trial on the issue of guilt 
was introduced by Gorman to establish an alibi for the Sac-
ramento burglary. Neither defendant testified. 
[la] Gorman contends that he was denied due process of 
law. by the use of Albertoni's pretrial identification and the in· 
court identification based thereon. Albertoni testified that he 
identified Gorman-atthedistrictattorney 's 0:ffice,-firstb1~ 
standing outside the door and listening to him talk with the 
district attorney for ten or fifteen minutes, and then by com-
ing into the office and confronting him. [2] Since the ideD-, 
tification took place before the decisions of the United Sta~,_ 
Supreme Oourt in United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S.2~8f;">·· 
. [18' L.Ed:2d 1149, 87 S.Ot. 1926], and Gilbert v. OaliforfNl.·.f, 
(1967) 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.0t. 1951], neither 
the identification nor any product of it was inadmissibk 
because Gorman did not have the assistance of counsel at ~ 
time. (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed 
1199, 87 S.Ot. 1967] ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Oal.2d 444. 
448 [62 Oal.Rptr. 419,432 P.2d 21].) [lb] As in the p~ 
gans case, however, we have scrutinized the record ..t .. 
respect to the pretrial identification to determine whether.~ 
70 C.2d 
wO/1it-
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man was denied due process. Since Albertoni had heard the 
robbers talk for over two hours but had not seen them un-
masked, it was reasonable to seek a voice identification before 
Albertoni confronted Gorman. It might have been preferable 
to have Albertoni hear several persons speak, but in view of 
the length of time he was able to hear the robbers talk during 
the crime, it was not unreasonable to have him confront a single 
suspect. (Cf. People v. Caruso (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 183, 188-189 
[65 Cal.R.ptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336] ; Simmons v. United States 
(1968) 390 U.S. 377, 385 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1254, 88 S.Ct. 
967].) Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that 
the district attorney in any way suggested the response Alber-
toni should make. We conclude that the procedure was not so 
suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of mis-
identification. (See Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. 
377, 384 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253] ; Stovall v. Denno, supra, 
388 U.S. 293, 301-302 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1205-1206].) 
[3] One witness testified to one conversation and three 
witnesses testified to another in which defendants discussed 
the homicide. The conversations were with defendants' 
friends or confederates and took place on the day of the kill-
ing while defendants were still at large.1 Since each defend-
ant implicated the other as well as himself, they invoke People 
v. Aranda (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 518, 530-531 [47 Cal.Rptr.353, 
407 P.2d 605] (see also, Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 
U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620]), and each contends 
the other's statements were inadmissible against him. There is 
no merit in this contention. During each conversation both 
defendants recounted various details of the crimes. Had one 
disagreed with what the other said, it is reasonable to assume 
that he would have said so. Under these circumstances the 
statements of each were common admissions· of both, and 
therefore admissible against both. (See former Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1870, subd. 3; Evid. Code, § 1221; People v. Robinson 
(964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 401 [38 Cal.Rptr. 890, 392 P.2d 970]; 
People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 699, 712 [172 P.2d 18].) 
[4] Defendants contend that the evidence of the Sacra-
~ento burglary was needlessly prejudicial. That evidence con-
lilsted of the testimony of an accomplice to the burglary, -
1It ISince iliese conversations were initiated by defendants when they 
.. ete not in custody and since there is nothing to indicate that they were 
t <ltd wholly voluntary, the trial court was under no obligation sua sponte tt ete:mine that the statements were voluntary before admitting them 
;Q~ eVIdence. (Of. Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368 [12 L.Ed.2d 
,84 S.Ot. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205].) 
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which was corrooorated by other evidence connecting defend-
ants with the guns taken during the burglary. Evidence of 
that crime was relevant to show that defendants had the guns 
used in the robbery and murder. It played a significant part 
in completing a chain of physical evidence that could dispel 
any doubts with respect to Albertoni's identification of 
defendants or the testimony of witnesses who were or may 
have been accomplices. Under these circumstances the proba-
tive value of the evidence of the burglary outweighed any 
possible prejudicial effect the evidence might have had. (Peo-' 
ple v. Stanley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 812, 818 [63 Cal.Rptr. 825, 
433 P.2d 913].) 
[5] Defendants contend that the district attorney com-
mitted prejudicial misconduct in his closing argument by tell-
ing the jury that Percell, the lookout for the Mission Inn 
robbery, had been sentenced for the robbery at the :Mission 
Inn, whereas in fact he had been convicted of another rob-
bery. The purpose of the argument was to rebut a possible 
inference that Percell testified pursuant to a bargain with the 
prosecution. No objection was made, however, and a timely 
admonition could have corrected any effect the misstatement 
could have had. (See People v. Mitchell (1966) 63 Cal.2d 805, 
809 [48 Cal.Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211].) Moreover, Percell's 
testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of many 
other witnesses. The error in misstating his record was Dot 
prejudicial. 
[6] Gorman contends that it was prejudicial error to 
allow Norene ]\{ichaels, one of the women in whose apartment 
the Mission Inn robbery was planned, to testify that she waI 
- afraid of Gorman because he had told her andotherstbathf-
had been imprisoned beca.use he cutoff a woman's breast ana 
crippled a man for life. There was no motion to strike or to 
admonish the jury to disregard the statement. Miss ~{ichaels' 
fear of Gorman was relevant on the issue whether she was .. 
accom plice whose testimony would require corroborat-
(Pen. Code, § 1111) or a person acting innocently una", 
"threats or nlena.ces" (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. Eight). E~ 
if it is assumed that the prejudicial effect of Miss ~iclla~!:. 
statement of her reason for fearing Gorman outweIg}led J 
probative value and that a timely admonition could not h: 
cured the error in admitting the statement, the error waJ' .. ' 
prej~dicia1. In view of the overwhelming evide?ce t !~ 
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feared Gorman did not contribute to its verdict on the issue of 
guilt. [7] At the trial on the issue of penalty, the details of 
the crimes for which Gorman had been in prison were prop-
erly proved and his statement to Miss Michaels was revealed 
to be a somewhat exaggerated boast. As such, however, it was 
admissible at the trial on the issue of penalty to show his 
attitude toward his criminal career. (People v. Bentley 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 458, 460-461 [24 Cal.Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d 
645] .) 
[8] Gorman -contends that the trial court improperly indi-
cated to the jury its belief that defendants had been proved 
guilty (see People v. Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 649 [58 
Cal.R.ptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889]) by discussing the timing of the 
trial on the issue of penalty before the conclusion of the trial 
on the issue of guilt. There is no merit in this contention, for 
the trial judge's remarks did not indicate that he believed 
that there would be a trial on the issue of penal~y but merely 
set forth for the convenience of the jury how long such a trial 
would take if it occurred. 
[9] There is also no merit in Osuna's contention, made in 
propria persona, that the prosecution suppressed the fact that 
certain witnesses were subpoenaed from outside the state. He 
asserts that this fact would be relevant to show the witnesses' 
flight, which would in turn support an inference that they 
were accomplices. There was no suppression of evidence, how-
ever, for the subpoenaing of the witnesses was a matter of 
record readily available to the defense. 
,\Vith respect to the instructions at the trial on the issue of 
guilt, it is contended that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct on second degree murder; in failing adequately to set 
forth the purpose for which the evidence of the Sacramento 
burglary was admitted; and in describing the jury's duty in 
tenns of determining the guilt or innocence of ea.ch defendant 
instead of in terms of determining whether each defendant 
Was guilty or not guilty. [10] Since tber~ was no evidence 
that the homicide was other than a first dE'gree robbery mur-
der, the trial court properly refused to instruct on second 
degree murder. (People v. Imbler (1962) 57 Cal.2d 711, 715 
J21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304].) [11] The court's 
lJlstrUctions on the evidence of the Sacramento burglary were 
adequate for a proper consideration of the evidence. Defend-
~nts did not request a more detailed instruction and the 
lnstrUction offered by the prosecution was not appropriate to 
Ule facts of the case. Accordingly, no error in this respect 
. OJ 
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appears. (See People v. lVadc (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 322, 334 [1 
Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].) [12] The court's references 
to finding defendants innocent rather than not guilty were in 
no way misleading and did not indicate that defendants ha.d 
any burden to prove themselves innocent. Thus, the court 
clearly instructed that a finding of innocence would be com-
pelled by the failure of the prosecution to prove guilt "to a 
moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt." 
[13] Although there was no prejudicial error at the trial 011 
the issue of guilt, the judgment imposing the death penalty 
, . 
must be reversed because of the error condemned in lVithcr-
spoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d 
776, 784-786, 88 S. Ct. 1770]. Twenty prospective jurors 
were, excused for cause who voiced objections to the death 
penalty. Of these, at least seven did not make" unmistakably 
clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the 
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evi-
dence that might be developed at the trial of the case before 
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty 
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to 
the defendant's guilt." (391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed. 
2d 776, 785], italics in the original.) 
Four prospective jurors were excused who stated that they 
did not "think" that they could impose the death penalty, 
but none gave an unambiguous answer to the question 
whether he could or could not do so. (See People v. Cha.co. 
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 772-773 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 
106] .) 
Another prospective juror was asked, ' 'Do you belie"e 
. because of your feeling or objection toward the death'penalty-
you would find yourself unable to return a verdicto! 
death ?"His answer, "Because of my objection to the death 
penalty -, " was cut off by the prosecutor's challenge, which 
was allowed without permitting the prospective juror to eo~ .. 
plete his answer. 
Another prospective juror stated that she was "against tht 
deat.h penalty and it would affect any decision I would baw 
to make." She was then asked, "On the question of guilt or 
innocence or on the question of penalty and a verdict of fim 
degree murder is found-." She interrupted, "Yes," aDd 
the question con tin ued, "-you could not be listening caN'- ' 
fully to the instructions of the Court and applying them to 
the instructions, it wouldn't dispel your prejudice in tha~ 
effect? " She answered, "I have thought it over and I don 
[70 C.2d 


































; of fin« 




Apr. 1969] PEOPLE V. OSUNA 769 
[70 C.2d 759; 76 Cal.Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678J 
think 1 could." It is impossible to determine from this 
exchange whether the prospective juror believed that her 
prejudice would affect her decision on the issue of guilt or 
only her decision on the issue of penalty. She did not state 
that her opposition to the death penalty would prevent her 
from voting for that penalty without regard to the evidence. 
Accordingly, she did not make "unmistakably clear" either 
that she would automatically vote against the death penalty or 
that her attitude toward the death penalty would prevent her 
from making an impartial decision on the issue of guilt. 
The seventh prospective juror whose exclusion is in ques-
tion stated that "1 guess I feel strongly that 1 could not" 
return a verdict of death. After another question she stated, 
"1 think I could go into it [the penalty phase] with an open 
mind. 1 'm afraid what I feel-I don't know." The prosecu-
tor then stated, "You indicated to us earlier you didn't think 
that you could return a verdict of death. It is an awesome 
thing. I know it. We want people w~th no strong feelings one 
way or the other, neutral people .... Do you feel from every-
thing that has been said that you do not have an open mind 
on the matter of punishment involved in a capital case-that 
there is nothing wrong with it." The prospective juror 
answered, "I feel I do not," and was then excused. Here 
again there was a failure to meet the Witherspoon require-
ments for exclusion for cause. 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In 
all other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
Peters, J., T6briner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan. 
J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) 
'10 C.2d-25 
